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
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Hillary Clinton's 'hacked' Benghazi emails: FULL RELEASE

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On the back of widespread public interest RT has decided to publish in their entirety a series of memos which were allegedly sent from a one-time White House aide to former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

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The emails, which were **allegedly sent** by former political adviser Sidney Blumenthal to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, were forwarded to RT by a hacker using the alias "Guccifer."

Guccifer was credited with hacking the AOL email account of Blumenthal last week, though the authenticity of the emails has not been verified.

The purported memos appear to contain sensitive information regarding the September 11, 2012 attacks on the US diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya, as well as the January 2013 hostage crisis in In Amenas, Algeria.

Blumenthal has been refraining from comments so far. RT reached Blumenthal's son Max, who confirmed that his father will not be making any remarks about the leak.

In the leaked emails distributed to the media, Guccifer copied and pasted the correspondences into new files using bold Comic Sans text layered over a pink background, possibly as a security precaution. The letter 'G' on the memos appears to be the hacker's watermark.

Below are 4 letters dating from September 12, 2012-February 16, 2013. Any omissions are unintentional, as we are publishing all of the information that has been provided to us in the interest of full disclosure.

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CONFIDENTIAL

September 12, 2012


For: Hillary

From: Sid


Re: Magariaf and the attack on US in Libya

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During the afternoon of September 11, 2012 new interim President of Libya Mohammed Yusef el Magariaf spoke in private with senior advisors, including the members of the Libyan Muslim Brotherhood, to discuss the attacks by demonstrators on U.S. missions in Tripoli and Benghazi. According to a sensitive source, el Magariaf was shaken by the attacks, and gave permission to commanders on the ground for security forces to open fire over the heads of the crowds in

an effort to break up mobs attacking the missions. During this session, a senior security officer told el Magariaf that the attacks on that day were inspired by what many devout Libyan viewed as a sacrilegious internet video on the prophet Mohammed originating in America. The Libyan attacks were also inspired by and linked to an attack on the U.S. mission in Egypt on the same day. At the same time, el Magariaf noted in strong terms that the atmosphere that made fostered these incidents in Libya is the product of widespread publicity regarding the security situation in the country between 2004 and 2010 and the cooperation that developed between a number of Western Intelligence services and the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi. 

2. This source added that el Magariaf's advisors believe that this situation adds to the President's growing concern over the unpredictable effects that will follow

current covert efforts by his political opponents to link him directly to foreign intelligence services. According to a separate sensitive source, el Magariaf noted that his opponents had often tried to connect him to the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) through the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL), a group established in opposition to former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, which el Magariaf led in the 1980s. In the opinion of this individual el Magariaf believes that he can survive potential negative publicity in this regard, but if this situation continues to develop in this manner it will complicate his efforts to establish an orderly administration in the country. Again, he stated that the attacks on the U.S. missions were as much a result of the atmosphere created by this campaign, as the controversial internet video. 

3. At the same time, this individual noted that several

of el Magariaf's advisors share his concerns in this matter, pointing out that the return of Qaddafi's intelligence chief Abdullah al-Senoussi for trial in Libya has heightened public interest in the liaison relationships conducted by the CIA and British Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) with Qaddafi's intelligence and security services. These same individuals note that they believe Islamist militia forces under the command of General Abdelhakim Belhaj captured files and documents describing this relationship from Qaddafi's offices in Tripoli. This fascination with Western intelligence operations in Qaddafi's Libya is also driven by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and its efforts to tie Western governments to human rights violations committed under Qaddafi. In this regard HRW has interviewed at least fourteen (14) individuals claiming that they were turned over to Qaddafi's forces by the Western powers. Belhaj is included in this group. **G**

4. (Source Comment: In the opinion of a very sensitive source, el Magariaf's enemies are working to take advantage of his suspected links to the CIA at a time when Western intelligence services are under scrutiny in Libya. They also fear that this situation will only grow more complex as Qaddafi's son Saif al Islam Qaddafi and al Senousi are brought before Libyan courts to answer for their crimes under the old regime, particularly during the 2011 revolution. These individuals believe both men will be linked to Western Intelligence during their trials.) **G**

5. According to this individual, el Magariaf is working with the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups to defuse this situation. He is particularly concerned by the level of violence between Sufi Muslims and Salafists, and believes he must maintain his reputation for impartiality if he is to defuse this growing problem. As he works to organize the

government, and disarm the militias, he cannot afford to lose the respect and trust of the Libyan people, especially at a time when cultural clashes between followers of the mystical Sufi tradition and ultra-conservative Salafis have taken central stage in the new Libya. This source adds that these religious conflicts were largely unknown during Qaddafi's rule.

G 6. (Source Comment: This source added that the individuals interviewed for the HRW report were former members of the Libyan Islamist Fighting Group (LIFG), an Islamist group formed in opposition to Gaddafi's controversial interpretations of Islam. These LIFG fighters fled the country in the late 1980s and went to Afghanistan to join the fight against the Soviet Union while also gaining training and experience for their own struggle. A separate source adds that messages to Libya from the CIA and SIS were found among the Tripoli Documents published by HRW, indicating

that the United States and Britain were eager to help Libya capture several senior LIFG figures, including its co-founders, Belhaj and Sami al-Saadi.)

7. As Libyan authorities struggle to control the armed rings that refuse to surrender weapons following last year's civil war, Salafis, who say Islam should return to the simple ways followed by Mohammed, have established their own armed gangs in post-Gaddafi Libya. They view Sufi practices as idolatrous. Since the start of the Arab Spring uprising across the region, a number of Sufi sites have been attacked in Egypt, Mali and Libya. Magariaf is determined to establish a democratic state based on Islamic principles. This individual adds that Magariaf remains dedicated to the idea of building a tolerant Islamic state in Libya. El Magariaf's opinions continue to be shaped by his experience with Qaddafi, whom he felt built a cult of personality in violation of all of the basic ideas

Excerpt missing

CONFIDENTIAL

October 6, 2012

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Libya cabinet politics

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. As of October 5, 2012 Mohammed Yussef el Magariaf, the new interim President of Libya told senior advisors that the abortive efforts to form a cabinet under new Prime Minister Mustafa Abushagur represent the first step in the next phase of the struggle for control of the new Libyan Government. According to a sensitive source Magariaf is concerned that Abushagur, supported by the Muslim Brotherhood's (MB) Justice and Construction Party (JCP), as well as certain of the other more

traditional Islamist groups, is looking to establish day to day administrative control the new government while defining Magariaf as a ceremonial Head of State.

2. According to this individual, the President, who is not affiliated with a particular party holding seats in the General National Council (GNC), spoke with the new Prime Minister immediately after Abushagur was elected by the GNC on September 12. At that time Magariaf advised him to include in his government members of former Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril's National Forces Alliance (NFA), Abushagur having only narrowly defeated Jibril in the GNC vote. At that time Magariaf was not aware of the fact that Jibril had already demanded 9 cabinet seats for the NFA; however, he did point out that even Jibril's more moderate followers were committed to the idea of a modern Islamic state and would fit into the new cabinet. The President came away from this discussion with the impression that Abushagur and his supporters intend to marginalize Jibril and the 39 Members

Excerpt missing

militia units, and the investigation of the murder of the United States Ambassador. All of these efforts are related to what he sees as his most important role, rebuilding the confidence of the international business community in its ability to operate in Libya safely and efficiently. To this end he does agree with Abushagur that it is important to replace the cabinet of former Prime Minister Abdel Rahman el-Keib, particularly Minister of Oil Abdulrahman Ben Yazza, whose connections to the regime of former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi, and the Italian Oil firm ENI made him unacceptable to the JCP and other conservative parties. That said, this individual notes that Magariaf was surprised and not pleased with the appointment to the ministry of Mabrouk Issa Abu Harroua, another technical expert, who previously worked for Libya's Zueitina Oil Company as well as in the oil sector abroad. Magariaf feels that Abu Harroua does not have the standing among the foreign oil companies that Ben Yezza enjoyed, although he was more acceptable to a number of the conservative members

of the GNC.

5. Magariaf was pleased that the Prime Minister, after dramatic confrontations with MPs and demonstrators who entered the GNC chamber, withdrew his cabinet nominations. The President again advised Abushagur to name former Oil and Finance Minister Ali Tarhouni to the Oil Ministry post; however, he fears that that Ali Tarhouni is seen as too close to Western governments to gain acceptance in the GNC. Magariaf is concerned that, while the new cabinet Abushagur plans to put forward on October 7 may contain some members of the NFA and other moderate groups, it will still be dominated by the JCP and conservative elements, and will again fail to gain acceptance, leading to a real government crisis.

6. According to this individual Magariaf and his advisors knew in advance that more than 100 protesters planned to enter the GNC session on October 4, in an effort to prevent MPs from convening to vote on the new cabinet. While Magariaf did not directly influence these protesters he did nothing to warn or advise

Abushagur on the developing situation. In particular, the protestors objected to the failure of the Prime Minister to name any minister from the Zawiyah region. Although the demonstrators eventually left the hall, a number of the independent MPs, who had said they would support the new cabinet, were shaken by the incident and changed their positions. In the end, according to this individual, Abushagur's efforts to rally their support failed, and he was forced to withdraw all of the nominees, promising to submit a new list on October 7, one that would take into account regional and political considerations.

7. In the opinion of a particularly sensitive source, the failure of Abushagur to name any NFA ministers to the new cabinet will continue to complicate the matter. For his part Magariaf is concerned over international perceptions regarding the nature of the new Libyan government. In this regard, he fears that the Western press is too sharply focused on the fact that the NFA holds the largest single bloc of votes in the GNC (38), missing the

fact that the real power in the parliament lies with the 120 independent deputies, who tend to be somewhat conservative on religious and social matters, while focusing primarily on local political issues. Magariaf believes that the appointment of Ali Tarhouni, or another liberal not associated with the NFA, would serve to reassure Western business and government leaders while demonstrating political balance to the Libyan people. Although he continues to make this point, the President has no indication that Abushagur will follow his advice. He does expect Abushagur to again select a majority of cabinet ministers associated with the MB and the JCP.

8. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf will remain focused on the security situation, particularly as he is having some success disarming the militias following the death of the U.S. Ambassador. According to this individual, Magariaf believes he must end the power of the regional militia forces before the Libyan economy can improve. The President

knows that foreign companies are the key to Libyan oil production, but he fears that they will not increase their commitment to Libya until the government can insure the security of their personnel and facilities. In a final note, this individual added that the Italian government is stepping up its activities in Libya, and the President expects them to pressure to Abushagur appoint an individual like Ben Yezza to the Oil Ministry, where he can favor ENI and other Italian firms.)

CONFIDENTIAL

December 10, 2012

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Libya, Benghazi, Oil

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Government, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

1. During early December 2012 Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan and President Mohamed Magariaf concluded a series of discreet meetings with selected tribal leaders from Eastern Cyrenaica region (Barqa in Arabic), after which they agreed that the problem of the growing Barqa federalist movement is gaining strength and will again become a major issue in early 2013. At the same time National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al Mangoush warned Zidan that the Eastern tribes have rearmed and reequipped in the past three months and are preparing

to reassert their desire for a degree of autonomy in early 2013. Mangoush also advised that the situation in the region between Benghazi and the Egyptian border may become increasingly complicated as Salafist fighters from Egypt continue to arrive in Benghazi. Mangoush reported that his staff officers have been advised in secret by aids to Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, General Mohammed al-Sissi, that, acting under instructions from Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi, military and security forces are taking steps to detain or neutralize extreme Salafist para-military groups and that a number of these fighters are fleeing to Libya. According to the Libyan commander, these Salafist fighters are comfortable in Benghazi, where many of them served with Libyan revolutionary forces during the rebellion against former dictator Muammar al Qaddafi.

2. In the opinion of this individual, Zidan and Magariaf, after consulting with Minister of Oil Abdulbari al-Arusi, decided to move forward with a plan dating back to the administration of

former Oil Minister Abdulrahman Ben Yezza dividing the National Oil Corporation's (NOC) production and exploration divisions into two separate firms. With this in mind, al-Arusi began discussing the matter with concerned parties in late November and early December. Included in these discussions were meetings with members of the local federalist council in Benghazi and tribal officials from Barqa. In these sessions Al-Arusi described a new structure managing all existing oil-related firms, while building new operations and raising funds from investors outside of the country. This firm will be divided into two branches, one in Benghazi and one in Tripoli. Al-Arusi added that the cost of this project will range between fifty (50) and sixty (60) billion dinars.

3. (Source Comment: According to a separate sensitive source, this concept came as a surprise to most of the local officials in Tripoli and Benghazi. This individual added that while the Western officials continue to have some questions about the matter, the Benghazi/Barqa leaders were, in al-Arusi's opinion,

positive, if not enthusiastic about the new initiative. According to al-Arusi, doubts on either side relate to the mistrust that remains between the two regions, but he is determined to move ahead in this matter and is supported by Zidan and Magariaf. According to this source, the president and prime minister are convinced that they must deal with this internal East-West issue before they can bring a stable security environment to the country, and disarm the remaining independent militias in each part of the country. This individual added that in private discussions al-Arusi stated that the tentative name for this new oil entity will be the National Corporation for Oil Refining and Petrochemicals Industry, with its headquarters in Tripoli, and substantive offices in Benghazi. Like the NOC, the new firm will fall under the Ministry of Oil and Gas.)

4. In addition, this sensitive source noted that Al-Arusi is also discussing the creation of a company specializing in mechanical construction related to the oil and gas industry. This firm would be based in Benghazi. The minister stated in private that he believes

such a company can be developed to compete with international firms in this very complex field. He also believes that such a firm must be managed by experienced, scientifically-qualified Libyans, with reputations for honesty. He noted that until as such a cadre is developed it may be desirable to use experts from Egypt to fill the immediate needs of the firm. Al-Arusi believes this firm should have offices in all of the oil fields and loading facilities. The minister also plans to establish an office in Benghazi, similar to Tripoli's oil institute, a facility that will train students looking to pursue oil-related studies. In addition, al-Arusi is making plans to reopen the Higher Petroleum Institute in Tobruk, which was closed by Qaddafi at the beginning of the revolution. He told a sensitive source that he expects the Tobruk institute to produce thousands of skilled engineers to provide Libyan managers for the future operation of the oil sector. Once the final details are set the Zidan regime will submit the entire package for parliamentary approval and financing

Excerpt missing

6. (Source Comment: Advisors to Magariaf state in confidence that, in their opinion this comprehensive plan for the oil industry will face opposition from individuals with links to foreign oil firms, primarily foreign trained engineers who hope to see greater privatization in the oil and oil services industries in the wake of the revolution. According to a particularly sensitive source, Zidan is particularly concerned about this possibility, noting that these individuals see this issue in strictly business terms, not considering the political issues, and the East - West situation, that are all part of the overall picture in Libya. At present al-Arusi believes that foreign oil firms remain concerned about the unsettled security situation throughout Libya, however; he is convinced that this new plan will help address this situation. At present, he noted that the large Italian oil firm ENI is stepping up its operations throughout Libya, and, with the support of the Italian Government, will continue to increase its investment in Libya in an effort to get ahead of the other foreign firms concerned in Libya.)

CONFIDENTIAL

February 16, 2013

For: Hillary

From: Sid

Re: Algeria/Libya/Terrorism

SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Government, as well as the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.

THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION COMES FROM EXTREMELY SENSITIVE SOURCES AND SHOULD BE HANDLED WITH CARE.

1. As of February 15, 2013 Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika instructed the commanders of the Algerian external intelligence service (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure - DGSE) to provide Libyan intelligence chief, General Salim Hassi, with selected portions of the

information obtained in the investigation of the terrorist attack on the facility at In Amenas. The president cautioned the DGSE commanders to manage the information being passed with care, keeping in mind that he is not convinced the new General National Council (GNC) government of Libya will survive through 2013. He also warned them to avoid passing any information that might be interpreted to indicate that the Algerian government had not been properly prepared for the attack. Bouteflika added that they should move forward with this exchange as quickly as possible, since Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zidan was calling him every day to push for greater cooperation, particularly regarding contacts between the Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM) terrorist groups and groups and individuals in Libya.

2. After some debate the Algerian DGSE officers

agreed to follow their president's orders and pass on sensitive information obtained from the interrogation of known and suspected MBM supporters detained in and around Algiers by the internal security forces. At the same time they informed Bouteflika's senior advisors that they would not provide the Libyans with the most worrisome reporting given to them by their liaison partners in the French DGSE. These Algerian officers also noted ironically that General Hassi and his staff did not realize that they had, for their part, provided the Algerian DGSE with intelligence that supported the French information.

3. According to a knowledgeable individual, the commanders of the Algerian DGSE reported to Bouteflika's staff that their work confirmed their initial suspicion that the MBM attack on In Amenas was related to French military

operations in Mali, as part of a loose but growing coalition of Islamist groups, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJWA), which was formed in mid-2012 with funding and support from al Qa'ida in the Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM). In the opinion of these individuals, MBM is a key member of this group and was best placed to strike at a Western facility in retaliation for the French operations in Mali. The Algerian officials also believe that Libya's Ansar al Sharia plays a role in this umbrella organization. The In Amenas attack allowed MBM to stage an operation to keep the Algerian government off balance. These officials also stated that while Algerian members of MBM had planned and led the attack, the guerrilla force included experienced fighters from Mali, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Egypt.

4. (Source Comment: Speaking on condition of absolute secrecy, this individual with sensitive access stated that the

Algerians are keeping information received from the French DGSE confidential. According to the source, this information concerned the funding of the MBM operation and a possible link to the Ansar al Sharia attack on the United States Consulate in Benghazi Libya on September 11, 2012, during which the U.S. Ambassador was killed. This individual adds that this information provided by the French service indicates that the funding for both attacks originated with wealthy Sunni Islamists in Saudi Arabia. During July and August 2012 these financiers provided funds to AQIM contacts in Southern Europe, who in turn passed the money onto AQIM operatives in Mauritania. These funds were eventually provided to Ansar al Sharia and its allied militias in the Benghazi region in support of their attack on the U.S. consulate. The money was used to recruit operatives and purchase ammunition and supplies. This person adds that the same tradecraft was used to provide

money used by MBM to organize the In Amenas attack. The request for these funds apparently originated in mid-January 2013, and the Algerians noted the speed with which the AQIM support network was able to pass them on to MBM organization leaders at their camps in Mauritania. In a separate conversation, the Algerian DGSE officers note in private that Libyan intelligence officers tell them that the Benghazi attacks were funded by these financiers in Saudi Arabia. They did not tell the Libyans that they had similar reporting from France.)

5. In a separate, private conversation, the Algerian DGSE officers stated that they held clandestine meetings with MBM representatives in the Mauritania/Morocco/Algeria border region during early February 2013, using their established protocols. The Algerians note that this is not the

first time MBM has violated their secret truce agreement, and they were particularly forceful in their meetings, pointing out that they had wrapped up much of the MBM support network in Algiers following the attacks. In response the MBM representatives apologized and assured the Algerians that AQIM left them no choice except to cooperate. The Algerians dismissed this explanation, noting that MBM has a similar excuse every time they stage an attack in-country. In the end the MBM leaders assured the Algerians that they would refrain from similar attacks, noting that they do not want a return to all out civil war with the Algerian military. The Algerian DGSE officers pointed out the fact that the Algerian Army, particularly the special forces units, were anxious to strike at MBM, and if there was another attack they would do so, showing no mercy for the MBM fighters.

6. (Source Comment: According to this extremely sensitive source, the leaders of the Algerian DGSE believe that AQIM and its allies will continue to strike at Western facilities in the Maghreb, taking advantage of countries where the security structure is disorganized following the uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011-2012. They believe that MBM is unlikely to carry out attacks in Algeria for the next six months. This individual noted that the commanders of the Algerian Army do not agree with this assessment regarding Algeria, and continue to press Bouteflika to allow them to launch large scale operations against MBM and other allied groups in the Southwest border region. The Intelligence chiefs believe the president will move on this request only if MBM violates their clandestine agreement once again. They note that he is committed to avoiding a return to civil war; the

last round of fighting having cost over 200,000 lives on both sides.)

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